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Abstract
Using the Chakravorty et al. (2006) ceiling model, we characterize the optimal
consumption paths of three energy resources: dirty oil, which is non-renewable and
carbon emitting; clean oil, which is also non-renewable but carbon-free thanks to an
abatement technology, and solar energy, which is renewable and carbon-free. The
resulting energy-mix can supply the energy needs of two sectors. These sectors differ
in the additional abatement cost they have to pay for consuming clean rather than
dirty oil, as Sector 1 (industry) can abate its emissions at a lower cost than Sector 2
(transport). We show that it is optimal to begin by fully capturing Sector 1's emissions
before the ceiling is reached. Also, there may be optimal paths along which the capture
devices of both sectors must be activated. In this case, Sector's 1 emissions are fully
abated first, before Sector 2 abates partially. Finally, we discuss the way heterogeneity
of abatement costs causes sectoral energy price paths to differ.
Keywords: Energy resources; Carbon stabilization cap; Heterogeneity; Carbon
capture and storage; Air capture.
JEL classifications: Q32, Q42, Q54, Q58.
∗Toulouse School of Economics (INRA, LERNA).
†Corresponding author. University of Toulouse, Toulouse Business School. 20 Bd Lascrosses  BP 7010
 31068 Toulouse Cedex 7, France. E-mail address: g.lafforgue@esc-toulouse.fr. We acknowledge financial
support from the French Energy Council (CFE).
‡Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI, LERNA).
1
1 Introduction
Among all the alternative abatement technologies aiming at reducing anthropogenic car-
bon dioxide emissions, Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) is of particular interest
(IPCC, 2005 and 2007). Even if the efficiency of this technology is still under assessment1,
current engineering estimates suggest that CCS could be a credible cost-effective approach
for eliminating most of the emissions from coal and natural gas power plants (MIT, 2007).
Following this line of argument, Islegen and Reichelstein (2009) point out that CCS has
considerable potential to reduce CO2 emissions at a "reasonable" social cost, given the
social cost of carbon emissions predicted for a business-as-usual scenario. CCS is also in-
tended to play a major role in limiting the effective carbon tax, or the market price for
CO2 emission permits under a cap-and-trade system. The crucial point is then to estimate
how far the CO2 price would have to rise before the managers of power plants would find
it advantageous to install the CCS technology rather than buy emission permits or pay a
carbon tax. The International Energy Agency (2006) estimates such a break-even price in
the range of $30-90/tCO2 (depending on the technology). However, assuming reasonable
advances in the technology, projected CCS cost should drop to around $25/tCO2 by 2030.
The deployment capacity of CCS strongly depends upon the type of the energy users,
or carbon emitters involved. Obviously, capturing emissions from a natural gas-fired power
plant will be cheaper than capturing emissions from vehicles powered by this fossil fuel.
More generally, CCS technology has been proved to be better adapted to large point sources
of pollution such as power plants or large-scale manufacturing than to small and scattered
emitters such as transportation, individual residence heating or agricultural activities. Al-
though in this last case filtering CO2 flows would be indirectly technically possible by
using e.g. air capture, this technology is still prohibitively costly. Keith (2009) underlined
that while this technology costs more than CCS, it enables the treatment of small and
1CCS technology consists in filtering CO2 fluxes at the source of the emissions. For this purpose, in fossil
energy-fueled power plants for instance, scrubbers are installed next to the top of chimney stacks. Carbon
is next sequestered in reservoirs, such as depleted oil and gas fields or deep saline aquifers. However, as
mentioned by Herzog (2011), the idea of separating and capturing CO2 from the flue gas of power plants
did not originate with climate change concerns. The first commercial CCS plants were built in the late
1970s in the United States to achieve enhanced oil recovery operations, where CO2 is injected into oil
reservoirs to increase the pressure and thus the output of the reservoir.
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mobile emission sources, an advantage that may compensate for the intrinsic difficulty of
capturing carbon from the air. Estimates of marginal cost of chemical air capture2 range
from $100-200/tCO2, which is higher than the cost of alternative solutions for emissions
reduction such as CCS. They are also higher than current estimates of the social cost of
carbon, which range from about $7-85/tCO2. But, as concluded by Barrett (2009), bearing
the cost of chemical air capture could become profitable in the future under constraining
cap-and-trade scenarios. For the time being, air capture is a somewhat extreme example.
However, even when considering the CCS technology, abatement costs can differ among
energy users, depending upon the location of the storage site and the type of reservoirs
(Hamilton et al., 2009).
This paper addresses the question of the heterogeneity of energy users regarding their
abatement costs. It examines how this heterogeneity affects the optimal energy consump-
tion and price paths as well as the timing of abatement policies. To tackle this issue, we use
the "ceiling model" developed by Chakravorty et al. (2006) and extended to the specific
CCS abatement device by Lafforgue et al. (2008-a and 2008-b).
The model can be briefly described as follows. We consider two sectors of energy
consumption which differ in the cost of the abatement technology they can use. Their
energy needs can be supplied by three types of energy resources that are perfect substitutes.
The first type is non-renewable and carbon-emitting (dirty oil), the second is also non-
renewable but does not contribute to climate change thanks to a specific abatement device
(clean oil). The third energy source is renewable and carbon-free (solar). The problem is to
characterize the optimal path of the energy-mix of each sector, given that the atmospheric
carbon stock should not exceed some critical ceiling. This energy-mix choice results from
the comparison of the respective full marginal cost of each energy option. Both the marginal
extraction cost of oil and the marginal cost of solar energy are constant and the same in
each sector. However, oil is assumed to be cheaper than solar. Producing clean oil requires
2Currently, chemical air capture is probably the most credible process for capturing carbon directly
from the atmosphere (Barrett, 2009). This technology consists in bringing air into contact with a chemical
"sorbent" (an alkaline liquid). The sorbent absorbs CO2 in the air, and the chemical process then separates
the CO2 and recycles the sorbent. The captured CO2 is stored in geological deposits just as is done in the
case of CCS technology used in power plants. Otherwise, the most obvious way to reduce the atmospheric
carbon concentration would be to exploit the process of photosynthesis by increasing forested areas or
changing agricultural processes. However, this is not the type of device we want to consider in the present
paper.
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an additional cost of carbon capture which varies between the two sectors. This cost is
assumed to be higher in Sector 2 than in Sector 1, and constant in both cases. Furthermore,
since the patterns of the optimal paths strongly depend upon the cost of solar energy as
compared with the full cost of clean oil, we examine various possibilities depending on
whether the solar cost is high, intermediate or low. Lastly, we assume that when a sector
abates its emissions, carbon is stockpiled in very large reservoirs. As in Chakravorty et al.
(2006), this suggests a generic abatement scheme of unlimited capacity.
It is important to note that the ceiling constraint can be relaxed owing to two miti-
gation options. The first consists in substituting clean oil for dirty oil and the second in
substituting solar energy for dirty oil. Each option both delays the (endogenous) point in
time at which the ceiling constraint begins to be effective and relaxes this constraint once
it is binding.
The key results of the paper are: i) Irrespective of Sector 2's ability to capture its
emissions, it may be optimal to begin Sector 1's abatement before the atmospheric carbon
concentration cap is attained.3 ii) Due to the abatement cost differential between the
sectors, it is also optimal to capture Sector 1's entire emissions before the ceiling is reached.
These first two results, obtained irrespective of the level of solar energy cost, contrast with
Chakravorty et al. (2006) and Lafforgue et al. (2008-a and 2008-b) who consider a single
type of energy user and a single abatement technology. iii) In the optimal scenarios where
both sectors consume clean oil, Sector 2 must start to abate its emissions when the ceiling
constraint begins to apply and it still needs to abate only partially. iv) The sectoral prices
of the energy-mix may be different.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3 we lay
down the social planner program and derive the optimality conditions. Section 4 examines
the case in which only Sector 1 consumes clean oil along the optimal path and discusses the
optimal scenarios depending on the level of solar energy cost. In Section 5 we characterize
the optimal path in the case where each sector consumes clean oil. In Section 6 we focus
on the specific problem of air capture. In this case, although Sector 2 does not have access
3This result is in accordance with Coulomb and Henriet (2010) who show that in a model with a single
abatement technology, when technical constraints make it impossible to capture emissions from all energy
consumers, and if such emissions are large enough, CCS should be used before the ceiling is reached.
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to CCS technology, it can capture the carbon directly from the atmosphere. Finally, we
conclude in the last section.
2 The model
Let us consider a stationary economy with two sectors, indexed by i = 1, 2, in which the
instantaneous gross surpluses derived from energy consumption are the same.4 For an equal
energy consumption q in both sectors, q1 = q2 = q, the sectoral surplus u1(q) and u2(q)
are thus equal: u1(q) = u2(q) = u(q). We assume that this common function u is twice
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, with limq↓0 u′(q) = +∞
and limq↑+∞ u′(q) = 0. We denote by p(q) the sectoral marginal gross surplus function
u′(q) and by q(p) = p−1(q), the direct demand function of the sector.
Energy can be supplied by two primary resources, a potentially polluting non-renewable
resource (oil) and a carbon-free renewable resource (solar).
Clean and dirty oil
Let X(t) be the available stock of oil at time t and X0 be the initial endowment. Each
sector can consume either "dirty oil" or "clean oil".
Consuming dirty oil implies some carbon emissions that are proportional to its use.
Let ζ be the unitary pollutant content of dirty oil so that the emission flow of sector i
amounts to ζxid, where xid is the dirty oil consumption of this sector. We denote by cx
the average delivery cost of oil, assumed to be constant and the same in both sectors. This
cost includes the extraction cost of the resource, the cost of industrial processing (crude
oil refining) and the transportation cost.
The consumption of clean oil is carbon-free but is also costlier than the consumption of
dirty oil. We denote by si the average cost that has to be borne by sector i in addition to
cx for using clean rather than dirty oil. This cost is assumed to be constant and smaller in
Sector 1 than in Sector 2: 0 < s1 < s2.
5 In other words, Sector 1 has access to a cheaper
4Since the focus of the paper is on the effect of heterogeneity on the abatement costs, all the other
sectoral characteristics are assumed to be the same in order to highlight the effects of this sole difference.
5si is an average cost per unit of oil and may be seen as a cost of capture and storage. The CCS cost
per unit of carbon captured in sector i amounts to si/ζ. It is assumed to be constant. For non-linear cost
functions, see Amigues et al. (2012).
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abatement technology than Sector 2. In both sectors we assume that carbon emissions are
stockpiled into reservoirs whose capacities are unlimited so that no additional rent has to
be charged.6
Denoting by xic the consumption of clean oil in sector i, the dynamics of X must
satisfy:
X˙(t) = −
∑
i=1,2
[xic(t) + xid(t)] (1)
X(0) = X0 and X(t) ≥ 0 (2)
xik(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 and k = c, d. (3)
Pollution stock
Let Z(t) be the stock of carbon in the atmosphere at time t, and Z0 its initial level. The
atmospheric pollution stock is fed by the emissions from dirty oil consumption. Moreover,
we assume that this stock is self-regenerating at a constant proportional rate α, α > 0.
The pollution damage may be neglected if the pollution stock does not exceed some
critical level Z¯. Above this threshold, the damage is supposed to be infinitely high.7 Put
differently, we assume that a carbon cap policy is prescribed to prevent catastrophic damage
which would be infinitely costly and that this policy consists in forcing the atmospheric
stock to stay below Z¯. Thus the dynamics of Z must satisfy:
Z˙(t) = ζ[x1d(t) + x2d(t)]− αZ(t) (4)
Z(0) = Z0 < Z¯ and Z¯ − Z(t) ≥ 0 (5)
When the atmospheric carbon stock reaches its critical level, i.e. when Z(t) = Z¯,
the total dirty oil consumption is constrained to be at most equal to x¯d = αZ¯/ζ, where
x¯d = x1d + x2d. Since the two sectors have the same gross surplus function, each of them
must consume the same quantity of dirty oil xid = x¯d/2, for i = 1, 2, when the ceiling
6In order to focus on the abatement options for each sector and their respective costs, we ignore the
consideration that reservoirs might have limited capacity. The question of the size of carbon sinks and
of the time profile for filling them is addressed by Lafforgue et al. (2008-a) and (2008-b) in models with
carbon cap, and by Ayong Le Kama et al. (2013) in a model with a standard damage function.
7Taking into account non negligible damage for Z < Z¯ would not change the main qualitative properties
of the optimal paths as shown in Amigues et al. (2011).
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constraint (5) is binding and when neither of them uses clean oil.
We assume that it may be optimal to use clean oil in each sector  and therefore to
abate carbon emissions  in order to delay the point in time at which the ceiling begins
to constrain oil consumption and/or to relax this constraint once it begins to apply, i.e.
cx + s1 < cx + s2 < u
′(x¯d).
Solar energy
Solar energy is a perfect substitute for oil. It is available at a constant average cost cy
which is assumed to be the same for each sector and to be larger than cx. Hence, denoting
by yi its consumption in sector i, the sectoral aggregate energy consumption amounts to
qi = xic + xid + yi.
As we shall see, the structures of the optimal paths strongly depend upon solar energy
cost. Thus three intervals of average cost have to be distinguished: high, when cy >
u′(x¯d/2); intermediate, when u′(x¯d/2) > cy > u′(x¯d); and low, when u′(x¯d) > cy.
We denote by y˜ the solar consumption rate solving u′(y) = cy. This rate y˜ reads as
the optimal sectoral consumption of solar energy when oil is exhausted and absent any
constraint on its use. That is, assuming that its natural supply is large enough, at least
as large as 2y˜, in which case no rent has ever to be charged for its use. The only physical
constraint on the yi's are then the non-negativity constraints:
yi(t) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 (6)
Social welfare and discounting
If (5) is satisfied, the social welfare function W writes as the sum of the sectoral net
surpluses discounted at some constant social rate ρ, ρ > 0. Otherwise, it is equal to −∞
(that is if the critical threshold Z¯ is overshot).
7
3 Social planner problem and optimality conditions
The problem of the social planner consists in maximizing W subject to the various con-
straints introduced above. Denoting by Si the instantaneous net surplus of sector i,
Si(xic, xid, yi) = u(xic + xid + yi) − [cx + si]xic − cxxid − cyyi, the social planner has
to solve the following program (P ):
(P ) : max
{xic,xid,yi}
∫ ∞
0
∑
i=1,2
Si(xic(t), xid(t), yi(t))
 e−ρtdt
subject to (1)-(6).
We denote by λX the costate variable of X, by λZ the costate variable of Z in absolute
value, by γ's the Lagrange multipliers associated with the non-negativity constraints on
the control variables, by νX the multiplier associated with the non-negativity constraint
on X and by νZ the multiplier associated with the ceiling constraint on Z. Omitting the
time index for notational convenience, the current value Lagrangian L of program (P ) is:
L =
∑
i=1,2
Si(xic, xid, yi)− λX
∑
i=1,2
∑
k=c,d
xik − λZ
ζ ∑
i=1,2
xid − αZ

+νXX + νZ [Z¯ − Z] +
∑
i=1,2
∑
k=c,d
γikxik +
∑
i=1,2
γiyyi (7)
The first-order conditions for optimality are:
u′(xic + xid + yi) = cx + si + λX − γic, i = 1, 2 (8)
u′(xic + xid + yi) = cx + ζλZ + λX − γid, i = 1, 2 (9)
u′(xic + xid + yi) = cy − γiy, i = 1, 2 (10)
λ˙X = ρλX − νX (11)
λ˙Z = (ρ+ α)λZ − νZ (12)
together with the associated complementary slackness conditions and the following transver-
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sality conditions:
lim
t↑∞
e−ρtλX(t)X(t) = 0 and lim
t↑∞
e−ρtλZ(t)Z(t) = 0 (13)
Remarks
Since cx is constant, the shadow marginal cost of the stock of oil must grow at the social
rate of discount. Defining λX0 ≡ λX(0), from (11), we get the following well known result:
X(t) > 0⇒ λX(τ) = λX0eρτ , τ ∈ [0, t] (14)
The transversality conditions (13) imply that if oil has some positive initial value λX0 > 0,
then it must be exhausted along the optimal path, i.e. limt↑∞X(t) = 0.
Next, since Z0 < Z¯, there is some initial maximum time interval [0, tZ) during which
the ceiling constraint is not active, hence νZ = 0, so that from (12):
λZ(t) = λZ0e
(ρ+α)t, t ∈ [0, tZ) (15)
where λZ0 ≡ λZ(0) and tZ is the first date at which Z(t) = Z¯. Clearly, once the ceiling
constraint is no longer active, λZ must be nil:
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λZ(t) = 0, t ∈ [t¯Z ,∞) (16)
where t¯Z is the last date at which Z(t) = Z¯.
Solving strategy of the social planner
In order to characterize the optimal paths, the first problem is to determine which sector,
if any, has to consume clean oil. Note that from (8) and (9), and under the assumption
that oil has to be consumed, each sector i must use either only dirty oil or only clean oil
at any time t, depending on whether ζλZ(t) is lower or higher than si. This suggests the
following test.
8This characteristic is standard under the assumption of a linear natural regeneration process of the
atmospheric carbon stock. For non-linear decay functions, see e.g. Toman and Withagen (2000).
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First, solve a modified social planner program in which the use of clean oil is not
possible in any sector. Let λ1Z(t), for any t ≥ 0, be the trajectory of the shadow marginal
cost of the pollution stock of this program, and λ¯1Z be the maximum value of λ
1
Z along its
trajectory. Consequently, either ζλ¯1Z > s1 and it would be preferable to use clean oil in
Sector 1 during a certain time interval, or ζλ¯1Z(t) ≤ s1 < s2 and clean oil would never be
used in any sector.
Assuming that ζλ¯1Z > s1, the next step consists in solving a second modified program
in which consuming clean oil is possible in Sector 1 but not in Sector 2. Let λ2Z(t), t ≥ 0,
be the new trajectory of λZ and λ¯
2
Z its maximum value. If we now apply the same test for
Sector 2, we conclude that either ζλ¯2Z ≤ s2 and only Sector 1 uses clean oil, or ζλ¯2Z > s2
and clean oil is used simultaneously in both sectors.
In the following sections, we will successively characterize the case where only Sector
1 consumes clean oil (Section 4) and next, the case where both sectors have to abate their
emissions (Section 5).
Notations
For clearer readability, we introduce the following additional notations. We first de-
note by pF (t, λX0) the common component of the clean and dirty oil full marginal cost:
pF (t, λX0) ≡ cx + λX0eρt, where F stands for free of tax and/or CCS cost.
In the figures to come, pi(t) denotes the energy full marginal cost for sector i, that is:
pi(t) ≡ min
{
pF (t, λX0) + min {ζλZ(t), si} , cy
}
, i = 1, 2.
Last, we use the following generic notations for the critical dates in the different sce-
narios:
- tZ and t¯Z are the dates at which the ceiling constraint begins and ceases to be active
respectively.
- tic and t¯ic, i = 1, 2, are the dates at which sector i begins and ceases to use clean oil
respectively, or equivalently, begins and ceases to capture either some part or the totality
of its potential carbon emissions.
- t˜ is the time at which pF (t, λX0) + s1 = u
′(x¯d), if it exists.
- t¯x is the time at which the initial oil endowment X
0 is exhausted.
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- ty is the date from which only solar energy is exploited.
Note that in some scenarios several critical dates might be confused, such as when the
solar energy cost is high, formally when cy > u
′(x¯d/2), so that t¯x = ty as we shall see in
the next section.
4 Optimal policies with abatement only in Sector 1
This case arises when the solving strategy tests introduced above result in ζλ¯1Z > s1 and
ζλ¯2Z ≤ s2. Several types of optimal paths may occur depending on whether t1c is smaller
or equal to tZ and depending on the cost level of the solar substitute. We first examine
the family of scenarios where Sector 1 deploys carbon capture before the time at which
the ceiling constraint begins to be active, that is t1c < tZ . These scenarios imply that
the sectoral energy consumer prices p1 and p2 can differ during certain periods. Next, we
consider the scenarios where Sector 1 begins to use clean oil at the precise time tZ at which
the pollution stock reaches its critical level. In such a case the sectoral energy prices are
always identical. Note that the case where carbon capture is deployed after tZ cannot be
optimal with constant marginal costs (see Lafforgue et al., 2008-a, p.593).
4.1 Sector 1's abatement starts before tZ
Let us consider successively the cases of high, intermediate and low average solar energy
costs. We show that the results of the former case strongly contrast with those of the
two latter cases, insofar as the aggregate consumption of dirty oil has to be shared out
between the sectors during some phases at the ceiling when solar energy is competitive.
In the high solar cost case, this allocation is always strictly determined, whereas in the
two other cases the global constraint on dirty oil consumption may give rise to an infinite
number of feasible allocations when solar energy is competitive and when the constraint
on the pollution stock is active at the same time.
4.1.1 The high solar cost case: u′(x¯d/2) < cy
To proceed as simply as possible, we reason graphically by considering Figure 1 below,
which plots the paths pF (t, λX0), p
F (t, λX0) + s1 and p
F (t, λX0) + s2. In this figure, each
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path can be obtained from the other by a vertical translation. Moreover λX0 is set small
enough such that the trajectories pF (t, λX0) and p
F (t, λX0) + s1 cross the horizontal lines
u′(x¯d), u′(x¯d/2) and cy at some finite dates. Furthermore, ζλZ0 < s1 in such a way that
the path pF (t, λX0) + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t starts below the path pF (t, λX0) + s1, but crosses this
last path at a time t1c which is earlier than tZ at which it crosses the horizontal line u
′(x¯d).
A last feature of Figure 1 is that, at time tZ , p
F (t, λX0) + s2 > u
′(x¯d).
[Figure 1. Optimal path supporting scenarios where clean oil is used only by Sector 1,
with an abatement beginning before tZ . The high solar cost case: u
′(x¯d/2) < cy]
The optimal scenario suggested by Figure 1 is a seven-phase scenario.
- Phase 1, before the ceiling and without any clean oil use: [0, t1c)
During this phase, ζλZ(t) = ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t < s1 < s2, hence dirty oil and only dirty oil
is used in both sectors. The phase ends at time t1c when ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t1c = s1, i.e. when
the marginal shadow cost of the pollution induced by dirty oil use equals the additional
marginal cost of abatement in Sector 1.
Note that during this phase the energy price is the same for each sector: pi(t) =
pF (t, λX0) + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t, i = 1, 2. Moreover, xid(t) = q
(
pF (t, λX0) + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t
)
> x¯d,
i = 1, 2, and since Z0 < Z¯, the pollution stock must increase during this phase. However,
the existence of such a phase requires that, at time t1c, the critical level is not yet attained:
Z(t1c) < Z¯.
- Phase 2, before the ceiling with full abatement of Sector 1's emissions: [t1c, tZ)
During this phase, s1 < ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t < s2 hence Sector 1 uses clean oil exclusively while
Sector 2 still uses only dirty oil. Consequently, the two sectoral prices now differ, p1(t) =
pF (t, λX0)+s1 < p2(t) = p
F (t, λX0)+ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t resulting in greater energy consumption
in Sector 1 than in Sector 2. Since at t1c the pollution stock is lower than Z¯ and since
x2d = q
(
pF (t1c, λX0) + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t1c
)
> x¯d, this stock is still increasing at least at the
beginning of the phase. The phase ends at time tZ when ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t = u′(x¯d) and,
simultaneously, the pollution stock reaches the stabilization cap Z¯.
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- Phase 3, at the ceiling with full abatement of Sector 1's emissions: [tZ , t˜)
During this first phase at the ceiling, ζλZ(t) = u
′(x¯d)− pF (t, λX0) > s1 and also ζλZ(t) <
s2, hence Sector 1 uses only clean oil while Sector 2 consumes only dirty oil, as during the
previous phase. However, since the ceiling constraint is active, the dirty oil consumption
by Sector 2 is bounded from above by x¯d. Consequently this sector is the only one that has
to bear the burden of the constraint: x2d(t) = x¯d. The shadow marginal cost of pollution
λZ(t) decreases as p
F (t, λX0) increases and the phase ends at time t˜ when ζλZ(t) = s1.
- Phase 4, at the ceiling with partial abatement of Sector 1's emissions: [t˜, t¯1c)
During this second phase at the ceiling, ζλZ(t) = s1. Since ζλZ(t) < s2, Sector 2 consumes
only dirty oil while Sector 1, being indifferent, uses a mix of clean and dirty oil. Now the
burden of the ceiling constraint is borne simultaneously by both sectors: x1d(t) + x2d(t) =
x¯d. Both sectors also consume the same amount of energy: x1(t) = x1c(t) + x1d(t) =
q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s1
)
= x2d(t) = x2(t), implying that x1c(t) = 2q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s1
) − x¯d
decreases, x1d(t) = x¯d − q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s1
)
increases and x2d(t) decreases. Sector 1 thus
gradually substitutes dirty for clean oil.
The phase ends at time t¯1c when p
F (t, λX0) + s1 = u
′(x¯d/2). At this time, x1d(t) =
x2d(t) = x¯d/2 and x1c(t) = 0. From this time onwards, Sector 1 must in turn use only
dirty oil, as clean oil becomes too costly in relative terms.
- Phase 5, at the ceiling and without abatement of Sector 1's emissions: [t¯1c, t¯Z)
This is the last phase at the ceiling. Since now ζλZ(t) = u
′(x¯d/2)− pF (t, λX0) < s1 < s2,
both sectors use only dirty oil and share equally the burden of the ceiling constraint:
x1d(t) = x2d(t) = x¯d/2. The phase ends at time t¯Z when p
F (t, λX0) = u
′(x¯d/2), i.e. when
λZ(t) = 0, which indicates the end of the period at the ceiling.
- Phase 6, post-ceiling phase of oil exhaustion: [t¯Z , ty)
This phase is a pure Hotelling regime during which only oil is consumed by both sectors
as in the initial phase, but now with λZ(t) = 0. Since p
F (t, λX0) > u
′(x¯d/2), we get
x1d(t) + x2d(t) = 2q
(
pF (t, λX0)
)
< x¯d and the ceiling constraint is no longer active. The
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phase ends at time ty when p
F (t, λX0) = cy and the oil stock is exhausted at the same
time.
- Phase 7, permanent solar energy consumption: [ty,+∞)
From ty onwards, solar energy is competitive and y1(t) = y2(t) = y˜.
The following proposition states the existence of such a path.
Proposition 1 Assume that u′(x¯d/2) < cy, that λX0 and λZ0 generate the full marginal
cost paths pF (t, λX0), p
F (t, λX0) + si, i = 1, 2, and that p
F (t, λX0) + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t has
the properties plotted in Figure 1. Furthermore the carbon stabilization cap Z¯ is attained
when pF (t, λX0) + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t = u′(x¯d) and the initial oil endowment is exhausted when
pF (t, λX0) = cy. Under these conditions the above seven-phase scenario is the solution of
the social planner problem.
Proof: Clearly, there are non-negative multipliers γik(t), i = 1, 2, k = c, d, νX(t) and
νZ(t), t ≥ 0, such that the first-order conditions (8)-(12) and the transversality conditions
(13) are all satisfied. This is obvious for the Lagrange multipliers γik associated with the
control variables. Next, we can show that νX(t) = 0, t ≥ 0 is the right candidate and that
the optimal trajectory of νZ(t) is given by:
νZ(t) =

0 , t ∈ [0, tZ){
(ρ+ α)[u′(x¯d)− cx]− αλX0eρt
}
/ζ , t ∈ [tZ , t˜)
(ρ+ α)s1/ζ , t ∈ [t˜, t¯1c){
(ρ+ α)[u′(x¯d/2)− cx]− αλX0eρt
}
/ζ , t ∈ [t¯1c, t¯Z)
0 , t ∈ [t¯Z ,∞)
(17)
Lastly, since the program (P ) is convex, the first-order conditions (8)-(12) are sufficient
and have a unique solution. 
Since the proofs of all the other forthcoming propositions are basically the same, they
will not be repeated in the next sections.
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Discussion
As far as abatement is concerned, it would also be possible to have Sector 1's full abatement
starting from the initial date. The first phase of the scenario illustrated in Figure 1 would
then be similar to the second phase, with clean oil consumed exclusively by Sector 1 and
dirty oil by Sector 2.
Assume for instance that the social planner is facing the initial conditions Z∗, Z0 <
Z∗ < Z¯, and X∗, X∗ < X0, corresponding respectively to the pollution stock level and the
available oil stock at time t∗, t1c < t∗ < tZ , and starting from Z(0) = Z0 and X(0) = X0
as initially considered. The optimal scenario associated with these new initial conditions
is then proved to be the continuation of the initial scenario from t∗ onwards: at time t,
any variable in the scenario corresponding to the new initial conditions takes its value at
time t+ t∗ in the original scenario.
The same remark applies to all the cases we will examine hereafter. We have chosen to
systematically present the longest possible scenario corresponding to the case under study,
beginning with a phase of dirty oil consumption in both sectors.
The pattern of the optimal scenario is the result of two main rules. The first is the
Herfindahl (1967) least cost principle which predicts the introduction of solar energy only
when oil has been exhausted. More generally this least cost principle gives priority to the
cheapest energy source, i.e. dirty oil, once the ceiling constraint is no longer binding. The
second driving force results from the dynamics of energy prices under the Hotelling rule.
The energy price never decreases through time, implying that if carbon capture has to
be deployed, it has to be at the maximum rate initially. The result is the full capture of
emissions by Sector 1 once the profitability threshold condition concerning price and cost is
verified. The progressive depletion of the resource stock causes an increase in the scarcity
cost of oil, λX(t), an incentive for Sector 1 to cut its abatement cost and revert gradually
to dirty oil. Such an outcome could not arise if there were an infinite supply of oil, i.e.
if λX(t) = 0. With an infinite oil endowment, Sector 1 should never stop fully capturing
its emissions, the ceiling constraint binding forever. The pattern of carbon capture in this
scenario is thus the consequence of the Hotelling scarcity effect when combined with the
optimal pollution accumulation pattern resulting from a global constraint on atmospheric
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carbon concentration. The same logic is at work in the scenarios that are examined below,
although with different consequences.
4.1.2 The intermediate solar cost case: u′(x¯d) < cy < u′(x¯d/2)
This case is illustrated in Figure 2.
[Figure 2. Optimal path supporting scenarios where clean oil is used only by Sector 1,
with an abatement beginning before tZ . The intermediate solar cost case:
u′(x¯d) < cy < u′(x¯d/2)]
The optimal path is now a six-phase scenario. The first four phases are similar to the
first four phases depicted in Figure 1, meaning that Sector 1's emissions again begin to be
captured before the ceiling is reached.
The differences between these two scenarios occur at the end of phase 4. In the present
case at t¯1c, p
F (t, λX0) + s1 = cy, contrary to what has been observed at the end of the
fourth phase in the previous scenario where we found pF (t, λX0)+s1 = u
′(x¯d/2) at time t¯1c.
Remember that during this fourth phase, since Zt = Z¯, the aggregate consumption of dirty
oil is constant and equal to x¯d, while the aggregate total consumption of oil is larger than
x¯d: x1d(t)+x2d(t) = x¯d. Sector 2 uses only dirty oil: x2(t) = x2d(t) = q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s1
)
>
x¯d/2 and Sector 1 uses a mix of clean and dirty oil: x1c(t) = 2q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s1
)− x¯d > 0
and x1d(t) = x¯d− q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s1
)
> 0. At the end of the phase, since now pF (t, λX0) +
s1 = cy < u
′(x¯d/2), we have x1c(t¯1c) > 0, contrary to the case illustrated in Figure 1 where
x1c(t¯1c) is nil.
The fifth phase [t¯1c, t¯x) is still a phase at the ceiling during which the aggregate con-
sumption of dirty oil is locked at x¯d: x1d(t) + x2d(t) = x¯d. Since cy < u
′(x¯d/2), the
aggregate consumption of energy amounts to 2y˜, which is larger than x¯d. The difference
2y˜− x¯d is supplied by solar energy since the marginal cost of clean oil in Sector 1 is higher
than the marginal cost of solar energy: pF (t, λX0)+s1 > cy.
9 The distribution of the dirty
9Since both cx and cy are constant, dirty oil and solar energy may only be simultaneously used during a
phase at the ceiling. A generalization of this result to the case of a damage function that increases with the
atmospheric carbon stock can be found in Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) and Tahvonen (1997). In particular,
using a stock-dependent marginal extraction cost, but a constant marginal cost of the backstop, Tahvonen
(1997) shows that there can be a multiplicity of simultaneous energy-use scenarios.
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oil aggregate consumption between the sectors, hence the correlative distribution of the
solar energy aggregate consumption, is of no importance.
The shadow marginal cost of the pollution stock remains positive, λZ(t) =
[
cy − pF (t, λX0)
]
/ζ >
0, meaning that the ceiling constraint still applies. This fifth phase ends when λZ(t) = 0.
At this point in time, the initial oil endowment must be completely exhausted, and the
ceiling must be definitively left: t¯x = t¯Z .
The sixth and last phase [t¯x,∞) is the phase of exclusive and definitive use of solar
energy: qi(t) = yi(t) = y˜, i = 1, 2.
The following proposition concludes the examination of this intermediate solar cost
case.
Proposition 2 Assume that u′(x¯d) < cy < u′(x¯d/2), that λX0 and λZ0 generate the full
marginal cost paths pF (t, λX0), p
F (t, λX0) + si, i = 1, 2, and that p
F (t, λX0) + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t
has the properties plotted in Figure 2. Moreover the carbon stabilization cap Z¯ is attained
when pF (t, λX0) + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t = u′(x¯d) and the initial oil endowment is exhausted when
pF (t, λX0) = cy. Under these conditions the above six-phase scenario is optimal.
4.1.3 The low solar cost case: cy < u
′(x¯d)
The case is illustrated in Figure 3. The important new feature of the figure is that we have
ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)ty < s2 at time ty at which ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t = cy − pF (t, λX0).
[Figure 3. Optimal path supporting scenarios where clean oil is used only by Sector 1,
with an abatement beginning before tZ . The low solar cost case: cy < u
′(x¯d)]
The optimal scenario is a sequence of five phases. The first two phases are similar to
the phases obtained in the previous scenarios. Once again, Sector 1 starts to capture its
emissions at time t1c before the ceiling constraint begins to apply. However, the present
scenario diverges from the previous ones at the end of the second phase during which Sector
1 fully abates and Sector 2 uses only dirty oil. In the present case at ty, the end of phase
2, the full marginal cost of dirty oil matches the level cy and the ceiling is attained at the
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same time: ty = tZ . Since cy < u
′(x¯d), the dirty oil consumption rate of Sector 2 amounts
to y˜ being larger than x¯d: xd(ty) = y˜ > x¯d.
The third phase [ty, t¯1c) is a phase at the ceiling where Sector 1 consumes only clean
oil, while Sector 2 combines dirty oil with x2d(t) = x¯d and solar energy with y2(t) = y˜− x¯d,
since it bears the burden of the ceiling constraint alone. During this phase, the shadow
marginal cost of the pollution stock is still positive as the constraint is still active: λZ(t) =[
cy − pF (t, λX0)
]
/ζ > s1. Because λZ(t) is decreasing, the phase ends at time t¯1c when
ζλZ(t) = s1. From this date onwards, capturing Sector 1's carbon emissions becomes too
costly.
The fourth phase [t¯1c, t¯Z) is similar to the fifth phase in the previous scenario, as
illustrated in Figure 2. The ceiling constraint still applies and no sector may use clean oil
because it is too costly, hence x1d(t) +x2d(t) = x¯d. The remaining energy needs of the two
sectors are supplied by solar energy: y1(t) + y2(t) = 2y˜ − x¯d. Again, the way dirty oil and
solar energy are shared out between the two sectors is a matter of indifference.
The shadow marginal cost of the pollution stock is positive, λZ(t) =
[
cy − pF (t, λX0)
]
/ζ,
and it declines to 0 at the end of the phase. At this time, the stock of oil must be exhausted:
t¯Z = t¯x.
The fifth and last phase [t¯Z ,∞) is the usual infinite phase of exclusive solar energy
consumption.
Proposition 3 Assume that cy < u
′(x¯d), that λX0 and λZ0 generate the full marginal
cost paths pF (t, λX0), p
F (t, λX0) + si, i = 1, 2, and that p
F (t, λX0) + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t has the
properties plotted in Figure 3. Furthermore the critical pollution stock Z¯ is reached when
pF (t, λX0)+ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t = cy and the stock of oil is exhausted when p
F (t, λX0) = cy. Under
these conditions, the above five-phase scenario is optimal.
4.2 Sector 1's abatement starts at t¯Z
Such policies are possible, provided that when ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t = s1, we have min {u′(x¯d/2), cy} >
pF (t, λX0) + s1 > u
′(x¯d) as the same time as the ceiling is attained. Figure 4 illustrates
the high solar cost case cy > u
′(x¯d/2), and Figure 5 the intermediate solar cost case
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u′(x¯d/2) > cy > u′(x¯d). This scenario may not occur under the low solar cost assumption
cy < u
′(x¯d), which will be explained later.
[Figure 4. Optimal path supporting scenarios where clean oil is used only by Sector 1,
with an abatement beginning at tZ . The high solar cost case: u
′(x¯d/2) < cy]
[Figure 5. Optimal path supporting scenarios where clean oil is used only by Sector 1,
with an abatement beginning at tZ . The intermediate solar cost case:
u′(x¯d) < cy < u′(x¯d/2)]
In Figures 4 and 5 the first two phases of the optimal scenarios are the same. First,
each sector consumes exclusively dirty oil up to the time tZ = t1c where the atmospheric
carbon stock hits the cap Z¯. At the same time ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t = s1, which implies that
abatement may now be a competitive option for Sector 1. Now, x1d(t1c) = x2d(t1c) =
q
(
pF (t1c, λX0) + s1
)
< x¯d since p
F (t1c, λX0) + s1 > u
′(x¯d).
It should by now be clear that the assumption pF (t1c, λX0) + s1 = p
F (t1c, λX0) +
ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t1c > u′(x¯d) on which Figures 4 and 5 are based is crucial. If pF (t1c, λX0) + s1
is lower than u′(x¯d), the second phase of the above two scenarios cannot occur.
The second phase occurs at the ceiling. Because pF (t, λX0) + s1 < min {u′(x¯d/2), cy}
the burden of the ceiling constraint has to be borne by both sectors. This result stems from
the fact that q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s1
)
> x¯d/2 and also that q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s1
)
< x¯d, resulting
in x1c(t) = 2q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s1
) − x¯d, x1d(t) = x¯d − q (pF (t, λX0) + s1), x2c(t) = 0 and
x2d(t) = q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s1
)
.
The contrasting features between Figures 4 and 5 are the same as those distinguishing
Figures 1 and 2. The phases occurring after the date t¯1c at which Sector 1 stops abating
its emissions in Figure 4 (respectively Figure 5) are the same as in Figure 1 (resp. Figure
2).
Finally, note that both sectors permanently face the same full marginal cost of energy.
Proposition 4 For the optimal scenarios in which Sector 1 is the only sector using clean
oil, two cases can occur:
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i) Sector 1 begins to abate its emissions before the ceiling is reached. In this case its
full marginal cost of energy is lower than Sector 2's during the first two phases of Sector
1's clean oil consumption;
ii) Sector 1 begins to abate when the ceiling is attained and then the full marginal cost
of energy is the same in both sectors during any phase of the scenario.
5 Optimal policies with abatement in both sectors
The case of abatement in both sectors arises when the solving strategy test in Section 3
results in ζλ¯2Z > s2. In this case the sectoral full marginal costs of energy are necessarily
distinct during the phases of simultaneous abatement. This results from the fact that the
additional marginal abatement cost is smaller in Sector 1 than in Sector 2, which means
that Sector 1 will necessarily abate if Sector 2 does so.
The existence of such scenarios requires the assumption that when ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t = s2,
pF (t, λX0) + s2 < min {u′(x¯d), cy}, as illustrated in Figures 6, 7 and 8 below for the high,
intermediate and low solar energy cost cases. This characteristic contrasts with the case
of the scenarios developed in Section 4, where abatement in Sector 2 was never optimal,
since the above inequality was reversed (see Figures 1 to 5).
[Figure 6. Optimal path supporting scenarios where clean oil is used by both sectors,
with abatement beginning before tZ in Sector 1 and at tZ in Sector 2. The high solar cost
case: u′(x¯d/2) < cy]
[Figure 7. Optimal path supporting scenarios where clean oil is used by both sectors,
with abatement beginning before tZ in Sector 1 and at tZ in Sector 2. The intermediate
solar cost case: u′(x¯d) < cy < u′(x¯d/2)]
[Figure 8. Optimal path supporting scenarios where clean oil is used in both sectors, with
abatement beginning before tZ in Sector 1 and at tZ in Sector 2. The low solar cost case:
cy < u
′(x¯d)]
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Whatever the cost of the solar substitute, the first three phases of the scenarios are
the same. The distinguishing features of the following phases are similar to the differences
observed in the scenarios depicted by Figures 1, 2 and 3 when Sector 1 is the only sector
using clean oil. For this reason we focus the analysis on these first three phases.
Phase 1, for t ∈ [0, t1c), is the usual initial phase during which both sectors use only
dirty oil and the pollution stock increases since xid(t) = q
(
pF (t, λX0) + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t
)
> x¯d,
i = 1, 2. The phase ends when ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t = s1, and abatement becomes a competitive
option for Sector 1. The pollution stock stays below the cap Z¯.
During the second phase, for t ∈ [t1c, t2c), Sector 1 uses only clean oil and Sector 2 only
dirty oil. Since x2d = q
(
pF (t, λX0) + ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t
)
> x¯d and initially Z(t1c) < Z¯, the atmo-
spheric carbon stock is still increasing. The phase ends when ζλZ0e
(ρ+α)t = s2 and, simul-
taneously, Z(t) = Z¯, implying t2c = tZ . Given the characteristic that has been emphasized
above, i.e. pF (t, λX0) + s2 < min {u′(x¯d), cy}, we get x2d(t2c) = q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s2
)
> x¯d
at the beginning of the next phase.
During phase 3, for t ∈ [t2c, t¯2c), the economy is constrained by the carbon stabilization
cap. The abatement option being comparatively cheap for Sector 1, this sector uses only
clean oil: x1d(t) = 0 and x1c(t) = q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s1
)
. Sector 2 bears the burden of
the ceiling constraint alone and consumes a mix of clean and dirty oil: x2d(t) = x¯d and
x2c(t) = q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s2
)− x¯d. Moreover, since p2(t) = pF (t, λX0)+s2 = u′(x2c(t)+ x¯d)
is increasing, the clean oil consumption of Sector 2 decreases during this phase. Time-
differentiating this last equality, we get x˙2c(t) = ρλX0e
ρt/u′′(x2c(t) + x¯d) < 0. The phase
ends when pF (t, λX0) + s2 = u
′(x¯d) in the high and intermediate solar energy cost cases
(see Figures 6 and 7, respectively), or when pF (t, λX0) + s2 = cy in the low solar energy
cost case (see Figure 8).
The subsequent phases are:
- the same phases 4 to 7 as the phases described in paragraph 4.1.1 when the solar
energy cost is high;
- the same phases 4 to 6 as the phases described in paragraph 4.1.2 when the solar
energy cost is intermediate;
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- the same phases 4 to 5 as the phases described in paragraph 4.1.3 when the solar
energy cost is low.
We conclude as follows:
Proposition 5 In the optimal scenarios where both sectors have to consume clean oil, for
any level of solar energy cost, Sector 1 must begin to capture its carbon emissions before the
ceiling is attained. On the other hand, Sector 2 begins to partially abate when the ceiling
constraint begins to be active.
6 Direct capture from the pollution stock: the air capture
option
Let us now assume that Sector 2 is not able to capture its potential emissions at their
source  hence it cannot directly use clean oil  but that society as a whole can capture the
carbon directly from the atmospheric pollution stock. We denote by a(t) the instantaneous
carbon capture rate from the atmosphere and by ca the associated average capture cost
assumed to be constant.
The dynamics of the oil and pollution stocks are now:
X˙(t) = −x1c(t)−
∑
i
xid(t) (18)
Z˙(t) = ζ
∑
i
xid(t)− a(t)− αZ(t) (19)
a(t) ≥ 0 (20)
Define the instantaneous net surplus S1 of Sector 1 as in Section 3 and the surplus S2
of Sector 2 by:
S2(x2d(t), y2(t)) = u(x2d(t) + y2(t))− cxx2d(t)− cyy2(t)
The new social planner program becomes:
max
{xid,yi,x1c,a}
∫ ∞
0
{S1(x1c(t), x1d(t), y1(t)) + S2(x2d(t), y2(t))− caa(t)} e−ρtdt
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subject to the constraints (18)-(20), (2), (3), (5) and (6).
The optimality conditions (8), (9) and (10) corresponding respectively to Sector 1's
energy choices x1c, x1d and y1, remain the same, as do the conditions (11), (12) and (13).
Concerning the optimality conditions applying to Sector 2's choices, (8) no longer exists
and (9) and (10) must be rewritten as:
u′(x2d + y2) = cx + λX + ζλZ − γ2d (21)
u′(x2d + y2) = cy − γ2y (22)
Finally, denoting by γa(t) the Lagrange multiplier associated with the non-negativity con-
straint on a, the optimality condition related to this last command variable is:
ca = λZ(t) + γa(t) (23)
together with the corresponding complementary slackness condition.
Assume that a(t) > 0 during some time interval. Then γa(t) = 0, ca = λZ(t) implying
that λ˙Z(t) = 0 and, from (12), we get: νZ(t) = (ρ + α)ca > 0. This situation is possible
if and only if Z(t) = Z¯. Thus, direct capture from the atmospheric pollution stock is seen
to occur only during some phases at the ceiling, implying that Z˙(t) = 0 and, equivalently,
that a(t) = ζ
∑
i xid(t)− αZ¯.
Assume furthermore that s1 < ζca, i.e. CCS is cheaper for Sector 1 than air capture
technology. Sector 1 must therefore consume only clean oil and a(t) = ζx2d(t)−αZ¯. Since
Sector 2 consumes only dirty oil and λZ = ca, it follows that x2d(t) = q
(
pF (t, λX0) + ζca
)
.
To make the analogy with the initial model, Sector 2's oil consumption clearly reads as
the amount of oil that Sector 2 should consume if it had access to clean oil at an ad-
ditional marginal cost s2 = ζca. In this case it would use x¯d units of dirty oil and
q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s2
)− x¯d units of clean oil as during all the phases [t2c, t¯2c) in Figures 6, 7
and 8 in Section 5. The flow of potential emissions that must be captured to meet this clean
oil consumption rate amounts to ζ
[
q
(
pF (t, λX0) + s2
)− x¯d] = ζq (pF (t, λX0) + s2)−αZ¯.
This is precisely the flow of direct atmospheric carbon capture when Sector 2 only has
access to air capture at the cost ca = s2/ζ. Thus, the effect on the economy is exactly the
23
same as if Sector 2 had access to clean oil at an additional marginal cost s2 = ζca.
Proposition 6 When Sector 2 only has access to air capture at a constant average cost
ca, ζca > s1, the optimal paths of the full marginal costs of clean and dirty oil in Sector
1 and the optimal path of the full marginal cost of energy in Sector 2 are the same as in
the case where Sector 2 has access to clean oil at an average additional cost s2 = ζca. The
sectoral energy consumption paths and the atmospheric pollution stock are the same in both
cases.
7 Conclusion
Using the Chakravorty et al. (2006) model, we have determined the optimal timing of
CCS policies for an economy composed of two kinds of energy users differing in the cost
of the abatement technology they have access to. In all cases the marginal cost of CCS is
constant, but capturing carbon emissions is more costly in Sector 2 than in Sector 1. Both
sectors face a global maximal atmospheric carbon concentration constraint.
In this framework we have shown that carbon sequestration carried out by Sector
1 must begin strictly before the atmospheric carbon stock reaches its critical threshold.
Furthermore Sector 1's emissions have to be fully abated during a first time phase with
constant marginal cost of abatement and a stationary demand schedule. This result stands
in contrast to the findings of Chakravorty et al. (2006) who concluded that abatement
should begin only when the atmospheric ceiling has been attained in a model with a single
sector and a single abatement technology.
The difference appears to be a consequence of the heterogeneity of the abatement costs
of the energy users. This heterogeneity constrains the potential of CCS to be at most
capable of absorbing the emissions of Sector 1 and thus to be always smaller than the
total carbon emissions of fossil energy consumers. In a constant CCS cost setting there is
no limitation on the amount of abated emissions below the gross emission level. In a case
where Sector 2's emissions alone would drive atmospheric concentration up to its maximum
threshold, full emission abatement by Sector 1 appears to be the only optimal choice for the
economy. Furthermore, with or without the possibility of abatement in Sector 2, delaying
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the development of CCS by Sector 1 beyond the time when the atmospheric carbon stock
reaches its maximum level is always suboptimal. However, even with abatement in Sector
2, the total carbon emission flow from the two sectors remains only partially abated,
resulting in a time phase during which the atmospheric carbon constraint limits the fossil
fuel consumption possibilities of the two sectors.
Note also that when both sectors have to capture their emissions, abatement in Sector
2 is undertaken only after the beginning of the atmospheric carbon ceiling phase and that
this abatement effort is always smaller than its gross contribution to carbon emissions.
This result is now in accordance with Chakravorty et al. (2006).
For the sake of computational convenience, we have assumed constant marginal cost.
In a similar ceiling model with a single sector of energy consumption, Amigues et al.
(2012) explore more sophisticated CCS cost functions that depend either on the flow of
sequestration or on the cumulated sequestration. Considering first a flow-dependent and
increasing marginal cost, they show that optimal abatement must begin during the pre-
ceiling phase. In this case, carbon sequestration both delays the time at which the ceiling
constraint begins to be active and relaxes this constraint once active. Moreover the optimal
sequestration flow first increases during the pre-ceiling phase and then decreases during
the phase at the ceiling. Next, they investigate the case of stock-dependent cost functions,
which implies two contrasting effects: a scarcity and a learning effect. The scarcity effect
generated by an increasing marginal cost function conveys the idea that it becomes more
and more costly to store carbon emissions as the stock already sequestered increases.
Conversely, the learning effect, obtained if the marginal cost function is decreasing, implies
that the deployment of CCS technology improves as the installed capacity increases. In
both cases, they show that it is never optimal to deploy CCS before the ceiling is reached.
However, these two effects have contrasting impacts on the pattern of the energy price.
Under the learning effect, the time path of the energy price can decrease locally while it
always increases under the scarcity effect.
It is interesting to observe that the economy may experience a complex dynamic pattern
of energy prices while being constrained by the atmospheric carbon ceiling. With a constant
abatement unit cost, the energy price at the consumer stage is composed of a sequence of
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constant price phases separated by increasing price phases. This complex shape translates
into the time profile of the carbon tax implemented to meet the atmospheric concentration
objective.
The carbon tax must increase over time before the ceiling is reached. Note that Sector
1 escapes the tax when fully abating its emissions and bears a comparatively lower se-
questration cost. The environmental constraint burden is transferred to Sector 2. Such a
discrepancy between sectors is justified by the fact that Sector 2 benefits from the carbon
sequestration efforts of Sector 1, a sort of positive "external" effect of Sector 1 upon Sector
2. Of course this is not a real external effect, since it operates through the carbon price.
But this observation opens interesting policy questions with regard to the use of carbon
regulation in order to develop non-polluting transportation devices, like the electric car
when electricity comes from power generation plants that use CCS technology.10 During
the ceiling phase, the carbon tax has an overall decreasing shape which goes down to zero
at the end of the phase. However this general shape is actually composed of a complex
sequence of phases with decreasing rates, separated by phases with constant rates. These
latter phases correspond respectively to Sector 2's abatement phase and to the partial
abatement phase of Sector 1 which follows its full carbon abatement phase.
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